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Children data privacy must be considered as integral 
and factored into the system design of Smart Connected 
Toy (SCT). The challenge is that SCTs are capable to 
gather significant amount volunteered and non-
volunteered data, which lacks privacy considerations. It 
is imperative to adopt a modeling technique that 
autonomously preserves privacy and secure children’s 
data in SCT transactions. This paper surveys the current 
data flow modeling techniques, which most of them do 
not have elements to address the privacy of Personal 
Identifiable Information (PII). This paper shows a Petri-
Net simulation which provides privacy assurance in 
order to minimize the risk of privacy violation of a 
child’s PII and related data. 
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With the advent of Smart Connected Toys (SCTs) such 
as Hello Barbie and Cognitoy Dino, the privacy of 
children’s information has now become a growing 
concern. The child's user-generated sensitive data, their 
context data and the Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII) provided by the parent can be directly linked to the 
child and ultimately their safety. Referring to the 
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) 
Special Publication 800-128, PII is defined as “any 
information about an individual maintained by an 
agency/organization, including: (1) any information that 
can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's 
identity, such as name, social security number, date and 
place of birth, mother's maiden name, and biometric 
records; and (2) any other information that is linked or 
linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, 
financial, and employment information” [1]. Many 
SCTs are integrated with sensory and networking 
capabilities, allowing for new opportunities, and 
extending capabilities outside the confinement of the 
toy itself, as well as providing an opportunity for a 
child’s information to be transmitted to an external 
source, such as Cloud services. SCTs allow the 
integration of a personalized application, which in turn 
provides additional opportunities and added value to 
each individual child’s gameplay or learning 
experience. SCTs are built as part of the Internet of 
Things (IoT) with the capability of providing Location-
Based Services (LBS), Mobile Advertisement (MA), 
Geo-Social Network applications (GeoSNs), and 
contextual data collection [2]. 
Children provide a unique user-base, for toy 
manufactures, which requires special attention in 
several key areas related to privacy. Firstly, it is widely 
accepted in most jurisdictions that a child’s data is 
considered particularly sensitive and should be treated 
with extreme care. Online privacy for children has been 
a great concern. This concern is inherited into the SCT 
computing environment; particularly when the child’s 
location can potentially be shared with other parties 
resulting in harassment, stalking, grooming, sexual 
abuse, exploitation, or personal data misuse [4]. Sexual 
solicitation and Internet-initiated offline encounters, 
which SCTs can provide an avenue for, are a chief 
concern for the online safety of children. The U.S. 
Department of Justice indicates that “1 in 25 youth 
received an online sexual solicitation in which the 
solicitor tried to make offline contact” [5]. Other 
concerns include market researchers attempting to 
collect a child’s personal data and usage patterns for 
targeted advertising and third-party advertisers inferring 
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information about a child based on their location and 
detailed behavioral patterns that may be used for the 
undesirable purposes [6]. Referring to de Carvalho and 
Bandiera-Paiva [17], the privacy and security 
requirements to protect any data, and restrict principals' 
interaction, must consider all users [17]. 
In the SCT design and system development, a key 
component to consider, and one which must be of focus, 
is the privacy of the user-generated data created by the 
child during play or involuntarily collected from SCT’s 
context. For example, the user-generated data in the 
SCT can range from basic audio recordings to a video 
of an activity which was unintentionally recorded 
during play. Contrary to the user-generated data, context 
data mainly focuses on a composition of various data 
points generated by the SCT from its operating 
environment. For example, the location data based on 
Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates, and other 
historical use of the SCT automatically generated and 
stored or shared by the SCTs. Taking into consideration 
the importance of the privacy of children’s PII, through 
either context or user-generated data, a degree of 
emphasis must be placed on the overall system design 
of the SCT, and its ability to factor in privacy 
preservation elements right from the initial stages of the 
SCT system design. Systems Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC) is a process consisting of four phases and 
adopted for the development of a software system 
including analysis phase, design phase, implementation 
phase, and testing phase [3]. With the current SDLC 
approach, the concept of the end user's information 
privacy, or information security, is often an afterthought 
brought on by an information breach or when a 
vulnerability has been identified that has potential to 
result in undesirable consequences.  
Considering  the significance of the data created and 
collected through a child’s interaction with SCT, PII 
collected by toy makers, and the contextual data 
generated by the toy; any improper data flow models 
employed in the system development without a proper 
privacy element mechanism within the toy's security 
infrastructure can lead to improper disclosure of a 
child’s information and  potentially put the child's safety 
at risk. Data-flow modeling and verification is an 
important challenge for traditional system workflow 
management[21]. The criticality of data-flow 
verification was first mentioned in [22]. Currently,  Data 
Flow Diagram (DFD), Privacy-Aware Data Flow 
Diagram (PA-DFD), and Privacy by Design (PbD) are 
widely adopted preferred models used within the 
industry to model data flow[3]. These existing 
approaches although are widely accepted have common 
drawbacks including but not limited to: lacking specific 
privacy element necessary to support sensitive data as 
part of the design element; lacking basic characteristics 
that support the concept of privacy of PII or context data 
that flows through an information system like a SCT;  
and  finally lacking concrete semantics, and verification, 
which makes it challenging to truly identify privacy 
violation. Our proposed approach integrates privacy 
elements in the modeling of the system flow, offer a 
well-defined mathematical semantics for verification 
enforcing a privacy to provide a sound level assurance 
to sensitive user information, and ability to simulate the 
data flow to project the behavior of the SCT data flow 
and possible privacy violation. This paper makes the 
following contributions: (1) Conducting a survey of the 
current data flow modeling techniques; and (2) Simulate 
a data flow model with privacy elements for privacy 
preservation by Petri-Nets. This paper is divided into the 
following sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Data Flow 
Model and Petri-Nets; (3) SCT Data Flow Simulation; 
and (4) Conclusions and Future Works. 
 
2. Data Flow Model and Petri-Nets 
 
This section surveys and analyzes Data Flow Diagram 
(DFD), Privacy-Aware Data Flow Diagram (PA-DFD), 
and Privacy by Design (PbD) widely adopted preferred 
models use in the SCT design. For example, de Cavalho, 
and Eler [18] used high-level DFD to model data flow 
in order to identify privacy and security threats within 
the smart toy environment. To ascertain detail 
requirements of system development, DFDs are used to 
produce the process model [8]. DFDs have been the 
industrial most widely used approach to information 
systems design. A “Complex process” also exists which 
consists of multifaceted functionality, or computation, 
that is detailed in an additional DFD [3], and “Data 
deletion” which is an extension of another type of flow, 
which acts as a data store for the incoming flow of 
information [7]-[23]. DFDs do not have the basic 
characteristics that support the concept of privacy of PII 
or context data that flows through the SCTs. Although 
DFDs are the most popular modeling technique, they 
fail to be adequate in designing a system which 
maintains the required privacy protection and handles 
sensitive user data like that of children; due to lack of 
specific elements to address privacy [7]. On the other 
side, PA-DFDs require the system analyst, or architect, 
to identify a classification of the data flows as personal 
data or non-personal data [3]. Additionally, information 
for personal data flow must include the name of the 
external entity as well as which personal data will flow. 
A typical PA-DFD identifies (i) the purpose for the data 
to flow, and (ii) the retention time for the use of the 
personal data [7]. This new information plus the existing 
DFD annotation is needed to detect the part in the model 
and transformed to privacy aware notation for PA-DFDs 
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[3]. Although PA-DFDs seems to be a good solution for 
modeling SCT data, it is found that this modeling 
solution lacks concrete semantics, and verification, 
which makes it challenging for its intended usefulness 
or the ability guarantee that no privacy violations will 
occur within the SCTs [7]. 
In evaluating DFD, PA-DFD, and PbD, these 
methodologies lack certain requirements to be used to 
successfully model the SCT privacy framework. The 
required stature of DFDs elements do not have a symbol 
or element which to represent privacy; and lacks, 
classification of the data flows as personal data or non-
personal data [3]. Alternately, PA-DFDs which seem to 
be a good solution for modeling SCT data, lack concrete 
semantics and verification required to test [7]. Lastly, 
although PbD has the cited principles above, and it is 
expected to be integrated prior or as part of to design, 
development, and implementation of any information 
system serving as insurance for privacy assurance, there 
is no enforcement mechanism to guarantee its 
implementation. The alternative option to DFDs, PA-
DFDs, and PbD is to explore other modeling techniques 
or approaches, such as Petri-Nets. Petri-Nets have the 
capacity to integrate privacy elements in the modeling 
of the system flow and offer a well-defined 
mathematical semantics for verification enforcing a 
privacy policy to provide a sound level assurance to 
sensitive user information.  
Petri-Net is a well-known mathematical modeling 
language that can be formally tested and verified. They 
are powerful modeling formalisms in computer science, 
and many other disciplines, which can address all the 
shortcomings of DFDs, PA-DFDs, and PbD. Petri-Nets 
utilize a “token”, as a primitive concept, and it is 
depicted with black dot residing inside a “place” of a 
Petri-Net graph [7]. Tokens can be at or can be absent in 
certain places, stipulating whether conditions associated 
with those places are true or false [11]. In modeling 
Petri-Nets, a change of state is denoted by a movement 
of the token from place to place; which is triggered by 
the firing of a transition; representing an occurrence of 
an action or an event. Generally, a transition is enabled 
when there are sufficient tokens in its input place, but 
the firing of any transition is subject to token availability 
and input condition. After firing, tokens will be 
transferred from the input places (old state) to the output 
places, denoting the new state [13].  
Colored Petri-Net (CPN) was introduced by Kurt 
Jensen [19] to address the issue with unstructured Petri-
Nets due to inability to distinguish between tokens in 
basic Petri-Nets. CPN is considered as a discrete-event 
modeling language; which has been under development 
since 1979 by the CPN group at Aarhus University, 
Denmark [7]. In a Colored Petri-Net diagram, a token is 
distinguishable from other tokens by using a unique 
color for each token. In addition, CPN addresses the 
issue undistinguishable tokens in basic Petri-Nets, by 
attaching a place of a CPN with a color set and allowing 
multi-color tokens. CPN has the same elements as basic 
Petri-Nets, and the transition functions operate in the 
same manner. Along with the characteristics of basic 
Petri-Nets, CPN uses high-level programming language 
based on the functional programming language 
Standard Markup Language (SML) [14]. CPN SML 
provides primitives for defining data types and various 
data manipulation, which makes models be compact 
[19]. 
 
3. SCT Data Flow Simulation 
 
We performed simulations of the model of the SCT 
system in learning about different states and behaviors 
regarding privacy of data (tokens) [20]. The SCT 
privacy is expected to have multiple states to form a 
global state of privacy for the system, so the ability to 
model concurrency and synchronization is needed. A 
system may have many local states to form a global 
state. This section has been broken into three: Model 
Configuration, Data Flow Simulation, and Discussion. 
 
3.1. Model Background & Configuration  
 
In our experiment, the model is created using a Petri-Net 
diagram. In our model, a change of state is denoted by a 
movement of the token from place to place; which is 
triggered by the firing of a transition; representing an 
occurrence of an action, such a turning the SCT on or 
recording audio.  
Definition 1 - A Petri-Net is formally defined as a five-    
                       tuple 𝑁= (𝑃, T 𝐼, O 𝑀0), where [11]: 
 
I.    𝑃 =  {𝑝1, 𝑝2 ,…, 𝑝𝑚} is a finite set of places; 
II.  𝑇 = {𝑡1, 𝑡2, …, 𝑡𝑛} is a finite set of transitions, 
𝑃∪𝑇≠∅, and 𝑃∩𝑇=∅; 
III.  𝐼:𝑃×𝑇→𝑁 is an input function which defines 
directed arcs connecting places to transitions. 
Here, 𝑁 is a set of nonnegative integers; 
IV.  𝑂:𝑇×𝑃→𝑁 is an output function defining 
directed arcs from transitions to places; and 
V.  𝑀0:𝑃→𝑁 is the initial marking. 
 
Definition 2. Assume there is a non-empty set 𝑆 = {s1, 
s2, s3… sN}. A multiset over S is a function 𝑚∶ 𝑆 → 𝑁 
that maps each element 𝑠 𝜖 𝑆 into a non-negative integer 
(𝑠) 𝜖 𝑁 called the number of appearances (coefficient) 
of 𝑠 in 𝑚 [6]. The net structure consists of a finite set of 
places, 𝑃, a finite set of transitions, 𝑇, and  
 
Definition 3. A Colored Petri Net (non-hierarchical) can 
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be represented as a nine-tuple 𝐶𝑃𝑁= (𝑃, Σ, 𝑉,  𝐶, 𝐺, 𝐸, 
𝐼) [6], where (Adopted from [11]):  
 
i. The finite set of places is denoted by 𝑃; 
ii. The finite set of transitions is denoted by 𝑇; 
iii. The finite set of directed arcs is denoted by 
𝐴⊆ (𝑇×𝑃)∪(𝑃×𝑇); 
iv. The finite set of color sets is denoted by Σ;  
v. The finite set of typed variables is denoted by 
𝑉, where ∀𝑣 𝜖 𝑉. Type[𝑣] 𝜖 Σ; 
vi. A color set function, which assigns a color set 
to each place, is denoted by 𝐶:𝑃→Σ;  
vii. A guard function which assigns a guard to 
each transition 𝑡 is denoted by 𝐺:𝑇→𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑅𝑣 
such that [𝐺(𝑡)]=𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙; and 
viii. An arc expression function is denoted by 
𝐸:𝐴→𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑅𝑣. For each arc 𝑎 𝜖 𝐴, this 
function assigns an expression such that 
[𝐸(𝑎)]=𝐶(𝑝)𝑀𝑆. Here, 𝑝 𝜖 𝑃 is connected to 
the arc 𝑎.  
 
In this paper, the SCT privacy framework depicting 
various component of SCT environment is proposed to 
model in CPN. Referring to Figure 1, Conceptual Model 
of Toy Computing Environment includes the standard 
real-life situational environment of an SCT including 
Physical and Social Environment, Cloud Service 
Environment, and Monitoring Environment. The 
Physical and Social Environment of the SCT and 
includes similar SCTs and an online connectable device 
such as WiFi. Within this environment, context data 
such as geo-location, original demographic registration 
information (name, age, gender, and address), directly 
created interaction data, and activity data is available. 
The expected types of data including but not limited to 
interaction captured data by the SCTs through a 
microphone, camera, etc. The SCTs will be generally 
equipped with a camera, microphone, GPS, and sensors 
for face and sound detection which allows the device to 
create and collect such data. Within the Cloud Service 
environment, the SCT manufacturers provide external 
services through Cloud services outside the immediate 
environment of the SCTs. This allows data to be 
exchanged or sent across from the SCTs to the cloud. 
For example, text, picture, video, sound (voice), and 
location and sensing data to the SCT manufactured 
services provider. Generally, they may be other 
information which can gather and infer from SCTs 
involved prior activity including historical data on the 
child such as the SCTs move around. Within the SCT, a 
tremendous amount of information is gathered, 
exchanged and transmitted to a connected to Cloud 
services.  Within the Monitoring Environment, the idea 
is prior to any communication to the Cloud service 
provider, a parent/guardian will have configured a 
privacy preference file which then is incorporated into 
the privacy policy for notification of any 
noncompliance. This attests that the guardian will be in 
charge to monitor child activities and be alerted in case 
any of the rules in the privacy policy is breached. 
Generally, a child (data subject) is associated with an 
identity, but the parent is the data owner and control 
access (read, write, modify) and use of the data other 
than a privilege granted to the child. It is because context 
data including location data, and it can lead to the 
identification of the child and his or her location. It is 
incumbent on the system to provide a level of initial 
privacy preference through the data flow model. This 
means that the SCTs cannot be used until the preference 
file is configured for access by the parents.  
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Toy Computing 
Environment 
 
3.2. Data Flow Simulation  
 
Figure 2 and 3 demonstrate the privacy of SCT physical 
and social environment. In order to simulate the SCT 
physical and social environment, we defined unique 
tokens represented by a color set. This color set 
represents the various tokens illustrating tokens within 
places. The color set as defined for SCT includes: 
 “A” (Activate SCT): This is the token which 
can be a trigger to turn on the SCT.  
 “MED” (Media (Audio, Video)): This is the 
type of data the SCT can transmit. 
 “CON” (Context Data): This is context data 
such as GPS data gathered by the SCT. 
 “TXT” (Text Data): This is generally text data 
in a situation where the SCT can.  
 “MEDPP” (Media with Privacy preference): 
Audio, video, an image with privacy 
preferences. 
 “CONPP” (Context Data with Privacy 
Preference): Geolocation data with privacy 
preference. 
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 “TXTPP” (Text with Privacy Preference): Text 
data with privacy preference.  
 
 
Figure 2: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment with Token at P1, P2, and P4 
 
 
Figure 3: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment after the first full transition 
 
Referring to Figure 2, prior to the SCT being turned on, 
at P1, the SCT is in "off" mode and as such no concern 
about the privacy of any data set can be garnered from 
the SCT. Upon the T1, the first transition, the SCT is put 
in an "on" mode, with possibly three places activated 
simultaneously. At this stage, as depicted in Figure 2, 
the SCT has the capacity to be in the record, context data 
gathering, or text input mode. The SCT in its current 
place (P2, P3, and P4) and the next transition (T2, T3, 
T4) can occur simultaneously. Now if we consider T2, 
and that the SCT is recording audio/video information, 
the next place P5 now contains audio or video file. At 
this juncture, the SCT can fire transition through T6, by 
sending the video or audio file directly to SCT internal 
storage P9, or by T7, applying the privacy preference 
rules and transition to P9 (SCT internal storage). 
Another option of transition from P5 is the audio/video 
created content through T5, which delete results in a 
sink transition. In this case, if the SCT did not have any 
privacy policy attached, and transition from P5 
(audio/video file) to P9 goes through T6, the next 
transition at P9 is to through T14 (to delete) and back to 
P2 (record mode). The other option from P9 would have 
to proceed to T15 (verify PP compliance), which will 
end up in P12 (failed PP complaint store) considering 
that the SCT transition through T6 without applying the 
privacy preference. At this point in P12, the SCT will 
transfer, T12, audio file back to P5.  Assuming that after 
failed application from the initial place, transition run, 
P5 containing the audio file transition to P9 through T7, 
the SCT will still have equal option to transition to T14 
(delete) back to P2 or transition through T15 to P14 (PP 
complain store). In this state, the SCT will transition 
T18 (verify Wi-Fi connection & transfer) to P15 (Cloud 
services or store) if the condition of Wi-Fi connectivity 
is met. If the condition fails, T18 returns to P14 the 
repeat again until it is successful or if to delete the file 
through T14 based on the privacy preference condition 
with data retention requirement, which is a sink 
transition. Text data goes through the similar place and 
transition stages as illustrated in Figure 2 except for text 
data the next Place after P1 is P4. Similarly, context data 
gathered in the SCT will have to go through a 
comparable transition as described during the recording 
of information. Based on the initial policy, the SCT 
transitions from P1 through T1 to P3 (GPS ID). P3 is a 
place for context data gathering, and results in transition 
through T3 where the system tries to identify context 
information and based on the result will end up in P6 
(not connected mode; no context information) or P7 
store of context information. If the system is at P7, the 
SCT system is forced to apply privacy preference and 
transfer content to storage P10. The next transition T13 
verifies PP compliance and transfer to P14 (PP 
compliant store) before it transitions to T18 onto P15 
(Cloud service). With the scenario above, there was only 
1 initial token at P1; we assume that this is the first time 
SCT is been used or there is no existing data anywhere 
within P2, Pi (where i represents highest number place 
within the system). Considering how SCT is been used, 
there can be multiple tokens at any given time within P1 
through P15. The results are shown in Figure 3. 
        
 
Figure 4: CPN Model of SCT - Cloud Services 
Environment Initial State 
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The Cloud service of SCT can be modeled with Petri-
Net to provide privacy assurance of data as illustrated in 
Figure 4 and 5. The CLDS (Cloud Service) color set 
includes: “DAT” (Data(Text, Media)), “DATPP” (Data 
with Privacy Preference), “CPP” (Cloud Privacy 
Preference), “PP” (Smart Toy Privacy Preference), 
“PUB” (Publish), “BIN” (Bind), “MNG” (Manage), 




Figure 5: CPN Model of SCT - Cloud Services 
Environment after First Full Transition 
 
       While the data exchange occurs between P4 and P5 
as well as P1 has referenced on P2, P2 will transit 
through T4 (bind) to P6 (Toy Computing Service, such 
as a Cloud storage). At this point, P6 can do the 
transition from T7 to P7 (Third Party Service 
Providers), or from P6 through T8 (call) to P9 (Toy 
Computing Application Programming Interface (API), 
which the services can use to access the privacy 
preference. Prior to the transition of P6 to P9, it is 
expected that P8 (Privacy Rule) would have transitioned 
through T9 (Apply) onto P9 before P9 would have 
transition T10 (Response) back to P6. At an initial 
offset, there is a possibility of multiple tokens and the 
current token which can be initialized at the same time. 
For example, the initial start can contain tokens at P1, 
P4, P5, and P8.  
       The parental model interface of the privacy 
preservation framework component is modeled by Petri-
Nets in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The Monitoring Interface 
begins at P1 (Blank Template) within the initial token, 
the next transition T1 (create) allows a transition from 
P1 to P2 (Privacy Preference template). At this point, 
the system will do a transition through T2 (Apply P. 
Preference) to P3 (Monitor). At P3, the system will 
transition through T3 (Configure Rules) to P4 
(Dashboard), and transition T4 (Apply Rules) to P5 
(SCT). On P5 at any time the apply rules for privacy 
preference are a breach; the system will trigger an alarm 
through T5 and alert back on P4, at any time P6 
transition through T5 and the collected information on 
P5 breaches Privacy Preference rules applied. At the 
initial stage (initial marking) of this Petri-Net diagram, 
P1 to P5 can contain tokens (e.g., M (1, 0, 0, 1, 0)). The 
privacy state of data is defined as a possible state where 
a privacy preference has been applied, and the data itself 
can be identified as private data, public data, anonymous 
data, encrypted data, confidential data, and de-identified 
data. Based on the modeling activities such set of data 
can transition from one state to the other. 
 
 
Figure 6: CPN Model of SCT - Monitoring Interface 
Initial State  
 
 
Figure 7: CPN Model of SCT - Monitoring Interface 
First Full Transition  
 
     The color set definition can be found on the color set 
information on the CPN model diagram in Figure 8 and 
9. At the initial state P1, all the data is private and 
created either by the SCT through the children. If the 
SCT fires transition T1 by inferring information from 
the SCT, the data is still private and returns to P1. If P1 
decides to process data and do transition through T2 to 
P2 (Data Storage), the data can be subject to various 
activities or possible transition. If P2 does transition to 
T3 (Release of Infor) and releases Information in this 
move, the data is now in P4 (Public) which has become 
public record. At this point, any transition which occurs 
T6 returns to P4 (Public). That record will become 
public record. Now considering that at P2, the System 
does transition through T4 (De-identified Data) to P5 
(Anonymous Data), the data has become anonymous. At 
P5 there is a possibility to do transition through T8 to P6 
(Unidentified information). With P6 any transaction 
which can result in a transition such as T9 will return to 
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P6. Considering at P5, the system transition through T7 
(Aggregate data) to P3 (Aggregated Data), the 
information is reassembled, and they system can 
Release information by transition T3 to P4 which is also 
public record. As per stated earlier, at P4 all transaction 
will result in a back as a public record.  
     The other option, other than T4 and T3, is for the 
system to do transition through T5 (Encrypt Data) to 
position P7 (Encrypted Data). Once at P7, the system 
can do transition through T10 (Release of Info) to P8 
(confidential Data storage). The next Transition will be 
T11 (Decrypt) which allow information to be decrypted 
back to P1. At any time within the lifecycle of 
information within SCT, the initial Petri-Net can have a 
token at P1. If this is not the first time of use, we can 
have concurrent and multiple tokens within various 
places of the system. Figure 8 provides details 
information after a full transition has occurred. Table 1 
depicts sequences of increasing tokens to demonstrate, 
the initial state of “CPN Model of SCT – Physical and 
Social Environment” and Table 2 shows the result of the 
first transition.  Subsequently, Figure 5 above shows 
CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social Environment 
with initial M (1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0). Table 2 and 
Figure 8 provide information after the first transition has 
occurred. All the “places” with zero tokens, in Figure 1, 
indicates that tokens have not reached a “place” as no 
transition has occurred. 
 
 
Table 1: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment Initial State Prior Transition  
 
 
Table 2: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment Result after 1st Transition  
 
      The other test begins with sequencing different 
number of MED, TXT data tokens which are added to 
the first transition place (P2, P4). Once the plain data is 
added, the “CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment” model will process the tokens applying 
well-defined privacy preference, assuring that all data is 
protected before moving to the cloud. In addition, in 
cases where the model fails to apply privacy 
preferences, the parent or guardian gets notified. Table 
3 demonstrates results of the final nth transition of a 
defined set of tokens, ranging from 1 through 6000, and 
results of “Number of PP Compliant (TEXT)”, 
“Number of PP Compliant (MEDIA)” and “Total 
Number Parental Notification Sent” after compliance 
fails. Figure 9-11 show a demonstration of model 
processing a 1001 token (“A”, “MED”, “TXT”), at the 
initial state, at the middle of the process and at the final 
transition. Figure 12 provides a comparative analysis of 
Total Number of Parental Notification Sent vs. Total 
Number of PP Compliant. 
 
 
Figure 8: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment Result after First Transition  
 
 
Table 3: CPN Model of SCT – Result After nth 




Based on the experimental results and discussion 
provided the following findings: (1) Excessive number 
of notifications more than expected; (2) Any type of 
notification system implemented for non-compliant 
within the Privacy Preservation engine needs to be 
tailored to exactly what the users is concern about. 
Example if users it only concerns about GPS 
information be shared by the SCT, then the notification 
should be tailored only to be alarming Guardian of non-














































3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 1 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 1 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 1 7 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 1 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 1 9 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
201 1 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1001 1 500 0 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 1 1000 0 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3001 1 1500 0 1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4001 1 2000 0 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5001 1 2500 0 2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0














































5 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 3 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 4 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 5 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 6 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 7 1 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 8 1 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 9 1 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 10 1 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 11 1 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
201 0 101 1 101 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1001 0 501 1 501 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 1 1000 0 1000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3001 1 1500 0 1500 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4001 1 2000 0 2000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
5001 1 2500 0 2500 1 0 0 0 0 0 0














































5 1 1 0 1 100 6 0 6 3 2 5
7 1 2 0 2 100 4 6 10 4 3 7
9 1 3 0 3 100 6 1 7 5 4 9
11 1 4 0 4 100 6 8 14 6 5 11
13 1 5 0 5 100 7 7 14 7 6 13
15 1 6 0 6 100 9 3 12 8 7 15
17 1 7 0 7 1000 16 10 26 9 8 17
19 1 8 0 8 1000 18 15 33 10 9 19
21 1 9 0 9 1000 14 12 26 11 10 21
23 1 10 0 10 1000 13 14 27 12 11 23
201 1 100 0 100 10000 112 103 215 102 101 203
1001 1 500 0 500 10000 531 504 1035 502 501 1003
2001 1 1000 0 1000 100000 981 1025 2006 1002 1001 2003
3001 1 1500 0 1500 100000 1500 1588 3088 1502 1501 3003
4001 1 2000 0 2000 100000 2048 1973 4021 2002 2001 4003
5001 1 2500 0 2500 100000 2569 2537 5106 2502 2501 5003
6001 1 3000 0 3000 100000 2954 3068 6022 3002 3001 6003
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there is no constraint on the number of tokens that can 
be processed by the SCT, the limited resource can fully 
exhaust causing the system to crash or fail. This result 
will help us in designing a theoretical model of privacy 
preservation engine as the result of the experiment 
shows that: (1) Petri-Net allows model my privacy 
preservation engine system design, simulate how the 
system will process information by the SCT, and 
provide us an opportunity to identify unsuspected flaws 
within the operations of the theoretical model of privacy 
engine; (2) It will allow us to identify areas within the 
engine, where unique information security technical, 
administrative or operational controls needs to be 
implemented to provide an extra mechanism to address 
threat and vulnerability within the theoretical privacy 
engine based on any information flow within the SCT; 
and (3) This provides us an opportunity to on an ongoing 
basis further simulate the behavior of the SCT privacy 
engine anytime a change is made to the SCT information 
flow prior to deploying it into an actual production 
environment. 
      The advantages of our proposed models, as 
presented in our simulated experiment, over existing 
models such as DFD, PA-DFD and PbD include: First,   
our proposed Petri-Nets models’ ability in dealing with 
concurrences and conflicts during data flow. As 
demonstrated in our simulated experiment, the models 
are able to handle concurrent tokens going through the 
system at the same time. Comparatively, in modeling 
DFD, or PA-DFD there is no simple way to model, 
simulate and verify the behavior concurrency or 
conflict.  Second, compared DFD, PA-DFD, and PbD, a 
formal semantics have been defined for Petri-Nets 
model in our experiments making it possible to verify 
and test to tokens for privacy violation. Our Petri-Nets 
models have the capacity to integrate privacy elements 
in the modeling of the system flow and offer a well-
defined mathematical semantics for verification 
enforcing a privacy policy to provide a sound level 
assurance to sensitive user information. The other 
discuss modelling approach, such as DFD, lacks 
concrete semantics and verification required to test 
privacy [7]-[24]. Without the ability to do this, it makes 
it challenging for its intended usefulness or the ability 
guarantee that no privacy violations will occur within 
SCT data flow.  Basically, the required stature of DFDs 
elements do not have a symbol or element which to 
represent privacy; and lacks, classification of the data 
flows as personal data or non-personal data [3]. Third, 
our Petri-Nets models are state-based instead of event-
based, so each state of an instant case can be modeled 
explicitly and simulated to determine the behavior and 
final result of each token. In our experiment, we are able 
to determine what will happen if a defined token fails 
privacy verification test within the system. Such a result 
cannot be achieved with DFD, PA-DFD, or PbD model. 
Lastly, another advantage worth noting here is that 
although modeling techniques such as DFD, PA-DFD 
can describe the boundaries of the system data flow[21]-
[25] it fails to be able to test the boundaries to determine 
its behavior as Petri-Net models can be simulated to 
present the results.  
 
 
Figure 9: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment with 1001 Tokens at Initial State 
 
 
Figure 10: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment with 1001 Token at Mid Processing  
 
 
Figure 11: CPN Model of SCT – Physical and Social 
Environment with 1001 at Final Transitions  
    
4. Conclusions and Future Works 
 
Moving away from traditional system development 
modeling techniques like DFD, PA-DFD, PbD and 
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adopting Petri-Nets as a modeling technique for privacy 
preservation in SCT system development is necessary in 
order to address privacy concerns. These privacy 
concerns can result in a breach of data, which can bring 
about catastrophic consequences- such as child 
abduction or death. In this paper, we discussed the SCT 
capacity to collect, process, and store PII, context data, 
or user-generated data. User-generated and context data 
are an increasing privacy landmine, which current 
SDLC popular modeling techniques such as DFD, PA-
DFDs, or other concepts (such as PbD), do not provide 
adequate privacy elements for. Privacy elements are 
necessary to establish a degree of assurance, 
confidentiality, and Integrity. In evaluating traditional 
modeling, it is clear that DFD, PA-DFD, and PhD 
methodologies lack essential privacy requirements to 
successfully model the SCT privacy framework. 
Although the PbD concept presents as an effective way 
of addressing privacy, in principle, its implementation is 
subjective considering that there is no mechanism for 
enforcing it integration into system development. 
Similarly, existing literature research [7] confirms that 
DFD lacks specific elements to address privacy that can 
introduce core vulnerabilities for modeling the SCT 
system or data flow. Although PA-DFDs can tackle 
privacy of personal data from the earliest stages of 
information system design, it fails to perform formal 
verification due to lack of concrete semantics, and it 
may not be appropriate to guarantee privacy assurance 
in the SCTs. On the other hand, Petri-Nets, have the 
capacity to integrate privacy elements in the modeling 
of the system flow including a well-defined 
mathematical semantics for verification and an enforced 
privacy policy to provide a sound level assurance to 
sensitive user information. As a result, it is a far superior 
modeling technique to ensure autonomous privacy 
preservation for SCT.  
 
 
Figure 12: Total Number of Parental Notification Sent 
Vs. Total Number of PP Compliant 
 
Future research will focus on Petri-Nets semantics by 
defining an appropriate transformation algorithm for 
DFD to PA-DFD, and PA-DFDs to CPN, which 
demonstrates the effectiveness of transformations such 
as an avenue for current SCT systems with full privacy 
assurance. Areas of interest include: (1) Construct SCT 
data transformation algorithm for conversion of existing 
SCTs PA-DFD models to CPN models. Emphasis will 
be on defining an algorithm by using pseudo code to 
transform a PA-DFD into a CPN model based on 
Definition 3 represented by the nine-purple (𝑃,𝑇,𝐴,Σ,𝑉  
,𝐶,𝐺,𝐸,𝐼). In conducting this transformation, part of 
what will be addressed is to parse the PA-DFD model, 
store information, define the color set for SCT data, and 
transformation of data flow. The new define color set of 
SCT data includes data privacy states where colset SCT 
= with Public | Anonymous | Private | Confidential | 
Unidentified | Aggregate|; and (2) Study SCT presented 
in DFD, PA-DFD, and CPN to demonstrate the core 
difference in handling privacy element essential. The 
sequence of the modeling will begin with modeling the 
DFD for the SCT with all privacy hotspot demonstrated. 
The next step will apply transformations on the 
identified hotspots in the DFD to obtain the PA-DFD. 
Finally, we will apply a transformation to the generated 
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